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Abstract – Reflections about the historical roots of our current scientific endeavors are useful from time to time as
they help us to acknowledge the ideas, concepts, methodological approaches, and idiosyncrasies of the researchers
that paved the groundwe stand on right now. The 50-year anniversary of Apidologie offers the opportunity to refresh
our knowledge about the history of bee research. I take the liberty of putting the founding year of Apidologie in the
middle of the period I cover here. The nascent period of behavioral biology around the late 19th to the early twentieth
century was intimately connected with a loss of concepts related to the mental functions of the brain, concepts that
were rooted in Darwin’s theory of gradualism in the living world including cognition in animals. This loss was
celebrated both in ethology and behaviorism as the gateway to scientific impartiality. Using this apparently strict
scientific approach, impressive discoveries were made by observing and strictly quantifying the behavior of bees.
The first forays into the brain, however, uncovered a richness of structure and function that reached far beyond
stereotypical input/output connections and opened the way to compensating the conceptual restrictions imposed on
us by traditional ethology. Honeybee research provides us with a particularly exciting story in this context. The
cognitive turn in behavioral biology is intimately connected to the increasing knowledge of how the brain works,
also in honeybee research. What has been achieved so far is just the beginning, but it gives us a glimpse of a
promising future. Teamwork between neuroscientists and behavioral biologists is needed to elucidate brain functions
such as the expectation of future outcomes and intentionality as an entry to animal intelligence reflecting the
flexibility and adaptability in behavior also seen in honeybees.
honeybees / intelligence / brain
1. INTRODUCTION
At the time the journal Apidologie was
founded, behavioral biology was comfortably em-
bedded in two parallel, rather independent streams
of thinking—ethology and experimental psychol-
ogy (behaviorism, Pavlovian psychology). Al-
though there were considerable battles between
the two disciplines, each found itself on a concep-
tually firm foundation. Ethologists preferred to
look into natural behavior in the species-specific
environment and selected those behaviors that
could be released or induced reliably multiple
times (Tinbergen 1951; Thorpe 1979). Behavior-
ists worked preferably in the lab creating condi-
tions that led to repeatable test conditions using
classified training schemes (Skinner 1988). Al-
though the research strategies and terminology
were very different between the two disciplines,
they had a shared understanding that interpretive
or intervening terms, particularly those that
included hidden reference to brain functions,
were to be avoided or even banned. Rollin
(1990) characterized this attitude convincingly as
“how animals lost their minds”. Furthermore, an
additional common ground of both schools was
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their harsh opposition to any form of “anecdotal
cognitivism” and anthropomorphism (Jamieson
and Bekoff 1996) as entertained by nineteenth
century zoologists including Darwin (see exem-
plary cases below). This victory over the “unsci-
entific attitudes of the past century” was celebrat-
ed whenever the debate about the differences be-
tween the two schools became too complicated
and when doubts appeared about their respective
conceptual delimitations emerged.
Insects were thought to naturally belong to
the realms of ethology, because their behavior
was obviously dominated by innate and rather
stereotypical routines. Furthermore, insects
have small brains, and thus, cognitive aspects
could be more easily dismissed. Von Frisch
(1962, p. 78) somewhat apodictically stated:
“The brain of a bee is the size of a grass seed
and is not made for thinking. The actions of
bees are mainly governed by instinct”. There
are several reasons why we should be surprised
by von Frisch’s statement. Von Frisch was a
highly informed naturalist and evolutionary bi-
ologist. He certainly knew Darwin’s (1859)
position, as expressed, for example, in the fol-
lowing statements taken from The origin of
species by means of natural selection or the
preservation of favored races in the struggle
for life : “… there may be extraordinary mental
activity within an extremely small absolute
mass of nervous matter: thus the wonderfully
diversified instincts, mental powers, and affec-
tions of ants are notorious, yet their cerebral
ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a small
pin’s head.” And “There is no fundamental
difference between man and the higher animals
in their mental faculties” (p. 448). He claimed
that “the lower animals, like man, manifestly
feel pleasure and pain, happiness, and misery.”
(p. 448). And: “If no organic being excepting
man had possessed any mental power, or if his
powers had been of a wholly different nature
from those of the lower animals, then we should
never have been able to convince ourselves that
our high faculties had been gradually developed.
But it can be shown that there is no fundamental
difference of this kind. We must also admit that
there is a much wider interval in mental power
between one of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or
lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than between
an ape and a man; yet this interval is filled up by
numberless gradations.” (p. 445).
Ethologists like von Frisch might have argued
that insects and arthropods in general followed an
evolutionary branch too remote from that of mam-
mals and primates, and thus, their behavioral strat-
egies of coping with the demands of the environ-
ment involved basically different adaptations, as
for example specialized sense organs and highly
tuned adaptations of adjusting instinctive re-
sponses (see below). We might also be surprised
about von Frisch’s statement because he devel-
oped the training method for bees to perfection,
documenting with each experiment how flexible
the bees’ behavior is. While applying these
methods, he discovered the honeybee’s most im-
pressive behavior (the waggle dance), which clear-
ly cannot be thought of as an instinctive behavior at
all since it is a communication process which is
based on learned flight routes embedded in the
memory about the explored environment (see be-
low). There is also a third reason whywe should be
surprised about von Frisch’s statement. The brain
of the honeybee although tiny was wonderfully
described as early as the mid-nineteenth century
(Dujardin 1850; Kenyon 1896), and the volume of
the whole brain or parts of it (the mushroom body)
was related to the social life and the complexity of
behavior in solitary and social Apoidea (von Alten
1910) indicating an intrinsic structure that is
adapted to its functions.
I have referred to Karl von Frisch at the outset
of this review because he is the most eminent
honeybee researcher of the last century, and also
because I had the privilege of talking to him
(though only briefly) in 1965. Obviously, we have
to reach beyond the last 50 years of honeybee
research in order to better understand the concep-
tual framework in which behavioral and neurobi-
ology developed in the first and the second half of
the twentieth century.
2. ARE BEES INTELLIGENT, AND
WHAT IS INSECT INTELLIGENCE?
Although nineteenth century naturalists and
honeybee lovers were excellent observers, they
were criticized for two inexcusable failures:
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reporting only single case events and using unjus-
tified anthropomorphic terminology. Indeed, rep-
etitions under strict experimental control were
rarely performed, and, if so, the conditions were
not reported. Anthropomorphic terminology was
not considered misleading or dangerous because
Darwin’s gradualism guided the comparative ap-
proach in behavioral studies as in comparative
morphology. Reading this literature gives the
strong impression that the authors, such as
Romanes (1883), Forel (1910), Buttel-Reepen
(1900), and even Maeterlinck (1901) with his
romantic style in praise of the honeybee, did not
mean mental operations of a human kind when
they used terms like intelligence or mental power,
but rather species-specific forms of such opera-
tions, although all of these authors kept their
meaning vague.
Here are three examples of these early en-
deavors into honeybee intelligence. (1) Is there a
measure of insect intelligence? “Sir John Lubbock
is very much inclined to deny bees all powers of
discrimination and all deliberation,… As proof he
provides an experiment that anyone can easily
repeat. Put half a dozen flies and the same number
of bees in a water bottle, lie the bottle down
horizontally and turn it so that the bottom of the
bottle faces the window of the room. The bees will
struggle for hours to find a way out through the
glass bottom before they finally die of exhaustion
and hunger, whilst the flies have escaped to the
opposite side through the neck of the bottle in less
than two minutes. Sir John Lubbock concludes
that the bee’s brain is extremely limited and that
the fly is much better equipped to solve this di-
lemma and find the way out…What lets the bees
down in the experiment of this English scholar is
their love of light and their intellect itself. They
evidently surmise that the escape route from every
prison is on the light side; so the bee is acting
logically, only too logically.” (Maeterlinck 1901,
p. 85). Quantifying intelligence has been an ob-
session in the nineteenth century including refer-
ence to brain size and volumes of particular brain
structures (see e.g. for humans: Mackintosh and
Mackintosh 2011, insects: Romanes 1883; von
Alten 1910). Maeterlinck’s further discussion
(not cited here) is helpful in this context because
he criticized not only the ignorance of species-
specific adaptations but also the quantification
process itself. Similar doubts were raised much
later with respect to learning functions and mem-
ory span and brain size (Rensch 1954).
Learning during departure. “As the bee takes
off she turns her head towards the hive and, while
continuously hovering up and down, she inspects
in detail the hive itself, the neighboring hives and
the hive stand, all the while directing her eyes
towards the hive. Only after this prelude are first
small and then ever-increasing orientation circles
traced and thereby the immediate andmore distant
surroundings memorized” (Buttel-Reepen 1900,
p. 41). Maeterlinck (1901) described a similar
situation with these words: “As soon as this vessel
(the honey stomach) is filled, the bee flies away
from that place, but not blindly and directly like a
butterfly or a fly. On the contrary, one will see her
fly backwards for a few moments; she buzzes
attentively in the window opening or around the
table, her head facing into the room. She memo-
rizes the place and notes exactly where the trea-
sure lies. Only then does she fly back to the hive
…..” (p. 93). Buttel-Reepen (1900) transported
young bees before their orientation flights and
those after completing orientation flights to re-
lease sites further away from the hive and found
that only the latter returned home. Full proof for
the notion that bees learn during departure from
the hive or the feeding place were provided only
much later in well-controlled experiments
(Opfinger 1931; Lehrer 1991). The study of these
“learning flights” provided multiple insights into
visual matching procedures of honeybees, bumble
bees, solitary bees, and wasps (Collett 1995; Zeil
1993; Zeil et al. 1996; Collett et al. 2013).
Social communication. “Finally, in order to get a
better idea of their intelligence, wewould have to try
to determine how they communicate with each oth-
er. …So they must have the ability to express their
thoughts and feelings, be it through a spoken lan-
guage or, more likely, with the help of a tactile
language or magnetic transmission, which perhaps
is linked to the properties of the material and to
senses that are completely unknown to us, and the
seat of these senses could be located in their myste-
rious feelers…. Once I applied a splash of color to
the body of an Italian bee. The second time she came
back with two companions. I captured these without
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bothering them. The next time she came back with
three companions, which I also caught, and so on,
until at the end of the afternoon I had captured 18
bees. So she had known how to pass on the infor-
mation to 18 companions… Do those companions
that turn up at the treasure trove discovered by the
first bee do nothing more than to follow her, or are
they perhaps sent by her and find the reward them-
selves using her information and her description of
the location? If this were the case, as one can easily
see, therewould be a huge difference in the level and
perfection of their intelligence…. I took an Italian
bee from an observation hive located not far from
the house, carried it up tomy study, and allowed it to
nibble on the honey while I dabbed it with a splash
of color. Once the bee had sucked her fill, she flew
back to the hive. I followed and saw how she ran
hastily over the other bees, stuck her head into an
empty cell, emptied the honey, and prepared to fly
out.” (Maeterlinck 1901, p. 95 - 98). Maeterlinick
continued by describing how he tried to prove the
hypothesis that the new bees did not follow the
trained bee but rather received a message about the
location and sadly acknowledges that he was not
successful. It was von Frisch who succeeded. He
also marked a bee that had brought back a newcom-
er and, in 1919, observed for the first time the
waggle dance. He noted in his “Recollections of a
Biologist” (“Erinnererung eines Biologen”, von
Frisch 2013, p. 45 and 60) that he first observed a
form of recruitment by the trained bees during his
color (1912) and later during his odor (1918) dis-
crimination experiments and expressed his surprise:
“I couldn’t stop thinking about it.” In 1919 he used
an observation hive housing a small colony from
which he trained bees to a feeding site for odor
discrimination. “I lured a number of bees to a dish
with sucrose solution, dabbed themwith red oil paint
and switched to a feeding pause. ....I couldn’t believe
my eyes. She (a scout bee) performed a round dance
on the comb which caused great excitement among
the red-marked foragers around her, and prompted
them to fly back to the feeding place. That was
probably the most momentous observation of my
life.” It took von Frisch and his co-workers nearly
50 years of intense and ingenious work to unravel
the mystery of the waggle dance (von Frisch 1967).
These three examples nicely illustrate that the
nineteenth century naturists were excellent
observers and posed the right questions, but the
contrast to the twentieth century was substantial.
The anthropomorphic wording did not restrain
their curiosity about unresolved questions and
was not used, as often assumed, as an explanation
for the observed phenomena. Still, compared with
the advances achieved primarily by the von Frisch
school in the first half of the twentieth century, the
limitations are obvious. Von Frisch succeeded
because he installed a training procedure that
allowed multiple repetitions of discrimination
tests under strictly controlled conditions, quantifi-
cation of the choice behavior, and separation be-
tween trained and untrained bees (von Frisch
1914). In addition, in 1919, he introduced a meth-
od for marking bees individually, an experimental
procedure whose impact on all subsequent studies
in honeybees since then cannot be overestimated
(von Frisch 1919). Against the background of
these advances, reports by nineteenth century be-
havioral biologists have to be considered as pre-
dominantly but not completely anecdotal and in
most cases lacking proper quantification. The
story-telling approaches were replaced by the es-
sentials of any modern enterprise in the natural
sciences, the clear separation between hypothesis,
data, and interpretation. Behavioral biology joined
the life sciences as an independent and flourishing
scientific branch. The parsimony argument (also
called Occam’s razor or Lloyed Morgan’s canon)
was accepted as a guideline in developing over-
arching concepts, possibly to a degree that became
restrictive for new views (see below).
Honeybee behavioral biology had strong roots
in what became ethology because the questions
arose from studies under rather natural conditions
and were motivated by evolutionary consider-
ations. For example, studies on color vision and
odor discrimination were motivated by insights
into the co-evolutionary relation of pollinating
insects and flowers (Sprengel 1793). Similar ar-
guments were applied to behavioral traits in nav-
igation (requirements for safe returns to the nest
site), the sense of time as a necessity for using the
sun compass in navigation, and social forms of
communication as adaptations to improve social
life and economy of pollination. However, train-
ing techniques and semi-laboratory test conditions
were applied in a similar way by experimental
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psychologists, and indeed, one of the first publi-
cations of von Frisch dealt with psychological
methods in working with bees (von Frisch
1905). So, von Frisch does not fit well in the
schematic separation of behavioral biology be-
tween 1910 and 1960. The focus on sensory phys-
iological questions including his work on the
waggle dance could probably be best described
as sensory ethology since he was mostly con-
cerned with understanding honeybee behavior as
governed by their sense organs.
The mental world of animals came back into
behavioral biology around the time that
Apidologie was founded. The elimination of the
mind of animals in behaviorism and the descrip-
tive attitude in ethology were increasingly seen as
unproductive and inadequate. In this sense, the
nineteenth century vibrancy was rekindled. The
cognitive turn in ethology can be traced to
Darwin’s writing emphasizing the continuity of
the animals’ mental life and the value of compar-
ative studies. Multiple overlapping developments
appeared in experimental psychology driven by
the insight into the self-imposed conceptual limi-
tations and the rigidity of the experimental de-
signs. In addition, the enormous breakthroughs
in neuroscience required novel views on the rela-
tion between behavior and its neural substrates. It
was not possible anymore to ignore or even ban
the cognitive dimensions of the brain’s working
(Bekoff et al. 2002; Menzel and Fischer 2011).
This “cognitive turn” was exemplified in hon-
eybees by an experimental study of the mecha-
nisms of learning. Two research lines were
followed along this cognitive turn in honeybees,
one as an extension of the training method intro-
duced by the von Frisch school (review: Menzel
and Giurfa 2006a, b) and one based on a labora-
tory setting, the proboscis extension response
conditioning paradigm (PER conditioning), ini-
tially introduced by Kuwabara (1957), further
explored by Vareschi (1971) in the context of
olfactory discrimination tests, and subsequently
analyzed against the background of procedures
developed over decades in the American tradition
of experimental psychology (Bitterman et al.
1983; see alsoMatsumoto et al. 2012). The highly
valuable paradigms developed in experimental
psychology during the time since Watson
(1930), Hull (1943), and Skinner (1938) were
recognized and introduced into the study of learn-
ing in honeybees (review, e.g., by Giurfa and
Sandoz 2012). The studies based on the PER
paradigm were particularly fruitful in attempts to
test the predictive power and the limitations of
learning rules like those developed by Rescorla
and Wagner (1972), review Giurfa 2003) and in
the search for neural correlates of associative
learning in the bee brain (reviews: Hammer and
Menzel 1995; Menzel 2014). For example, learn-
ing of mixtures of odors can be designed such that
elementary explanations do not apply. In a nega-
tive patterning case, for instance, the bee has to
learn to respond to the single stimuli A and B but
not to their compound AB (A+, B+, AB−). Thus,
the animal learns that AB has to be different from
the linear sum of A and B. An elementary asso-
ciative account would predict that the animal
responds to AB even stronger than to the learned
elements A and B, but it does not. In a different
task, biconditional discrimination, the bee learns
to respond to the compounds AB and CD but not
to the compounds AC and BD (AB+, CD+, AC−,
BD−). Again, solving this problem cannot be
explained by rules of elementary associations
(Menzel and Giurfa 2006a, b). The instrumental
forms of learning in free-flying bees uncovered
cognitive dimensions like stimulus generalization
(Giurfa et al. 2001) and expectation, e.g., in a
matching-to-sample paradigm (Giurfa et al.
1996) or a spatial cuing effect (Eckstein et al.
2013). Over the years, the conceptual limitations
of elementary forms of learning were increasingly
recognized, and the direction of the research
shifted to paradigms addressing configural forms
of learning, context-dependent forms of learning,
extraction of learning rules, and exploratory
forms of learning (review Menzel et al. 2007).
The transition from traditional ethology to cogni-
tive ethology is still an ongoing process accom-
panied by quite a few and only slowly vanishing
conflicts.
Let me give one example: the debate about the
cognitive map in honeybee navigation (Menzel
2012, 2017). The cognitive explanation of a task,
in this case navigation, has the property of bringing
together diverse isolated tasks on an integrating
level, while non-cognitive explanations assume
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independent sub-functions. Non-cognitive explana-
tions accommodate the experimental procedure be-
cause the individual experiment always examines
only a small set of parameters or even a single
parameter and remains in traditional ethology. Of
course, a bee locates a place not only according to
its situation relative to the visual objects perceived
at the same time but also according to the flight
vector to that place, its position in relation to elon-
gated landscape features, the odor traces carried by
thewind to the animal, andmuchmore. Navigation,
like many other behaviors, is embedded in a diverse
parameter field, and it is absolutely imperative for
the experimenter to exclude certain parameters and
to examine individual ones in isolation. However,
this gives rise to the problem that these individual
tasks are too quickly viewed in isolation and
interpreted as sufficient for each type of navigation.
One important objection to the cognitive expla-
nation of our experiments (Menzel et al. 2005;
Menzel et al. 2011) rests on the argument that the
novel shortcuts, which can be seen as an indicator
for a map-like memory structure (Tolman 1948),
are simply the result of a vector addition (Cruse
andWehner 2011). We addressed this argument in
an experiment based on the following design. The
vector addition argument is based on the fact that
the bees perform their novel shortcuts (in earlier
experiments, this was the return flight to the hive
via the feeding site (Menzel et al. 2005), in later
experiments, the direct flight between the learned
site and the dance-communicated site (Menzel
et al. 2011)) according to the sun compass, since
all vectors used for vector addition refer to the sun
compass. In order to test this assumption, we
would have to rotate the sun vis-à-vis the earth
with its landmarks and check whether the animals
still perform their novel shortcuts correctly. This
rotation of the sun vis-à-vis the earth was achieved
by placing the animals under general anesthesia
for a period of 6 h. During this time, the bee’s
internal clock comes to an almost complete stand-
still and re-adjusts to the correct value only after a
number of days (Cheeseman et al. 2012). We
found, as expected, that the animals perform their
initial vector flight in such a way that they perceive
the sun rotated 90 degrees relative to the earth.
Then, however, they fly back to their hive directly,
just like the control bees (Cheeseman et al. 2014).
This means that they do not use the sun compass
for the return flight, neither for the vector addition
nor for reading homing flight vectors that might be
associated with certain landmarks. The latter is
assumed in the model of Cruse and Wehner
(2011). In fact, after recognizing the unexpected
(actually wrong) landmarks on the vector flight,
they must use the spatial arrangement of the land-
marks to identify their correct location and then
take a novel shortcut flight that ignores the sun
compass (and thus all features deduced from it)
and orients exclusively according to the arrange-
ment of the landmarks. This behavior, however,
cannot be explained without a cognitive map as
introduced by Tolman (1948). However, our col-
leagues also presented two arguments against this
interpretation: (1) the animals could, during the
short vector flight, correct their internal clocks
and thus their sun compass, and (2) they could
indeed use the profile of the horizon for navigation
(Cheung et al. 2014). These arguments could eas-
ily be rejected based on previously published data
(Cheeseman et al. 2014).
Intelligence and the brainControversies like this
one are hard to finally resolve with behavioral
studies only. A decision will ultimately have to
come from the understanding of underlying brain
processes because the different interpretations of
behavioral data refer to very different brain mech-
anisms. “The hippocampus as a cognitive map”
(the title of the famous book by O'Keefe and
Nadel 1978) provides a telling story. The discovery
of place cells, head direction cells, border cells, grid
cells, and a few more types of neurons in the
hippocampus terminated the debate initiated by
Tolman (1990)’s proposal of a cognitive map in
mammals. No behavioral or neurobiologist today
would question that mammals navigate according
to the spatial relations of landmarks as coded in the
hippocampus in addition to other forms of naviga-
tion that are often considered to be more simple.
No such knowledge is (yet) available for insects.
The central complex in the insect brain codes sun
compass–related directions (locusts: Homberg
et al. 2011, possibly also in Drosophila: Seelig
and Jayaraman 2015; Fisher et al. 2019) in neurons
that are functionally comparable to head direction
cells in mammals, but how (and whether) spatial
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relations of landmarks are coded and stored in the
insect brain is unknown. Direct reading of compass
directions from the sun azimuth or polarized light
pattern is not an essential requirement of navigation
in honeybees since bees find their way in reference
to learned landmark features only. When the flight
direction in relation to landmarks is encoded in the
waggle dance (see below), then they need to refer it
to the sun compass (von Frisch and Lindauer
1954), but this does not prove the sun compass as
an essential component of navigation in flight. It is
thus possible that sun compass–related properties
as processed in the central complex are of minor
importance for in-flight navigation and provide
head direction information only. Formal models
can be derived from the aerial view of flying in-
sects that relate sun compass directions to ground
structures (review: Webb 2019), but it is unknown
whether they model neural processes in the insect
brain during navigation (e.g., underlying path inte-
gration, association of landmark structures with
directions, and combining multiple areal views).
The key question in the context of a cognitive
approach to navigation is whether the memory of
the environment, or, to be more precise, the knowl-
edge base of the experienced environment allows
the animal to choose between goals and the respec-
tive paths towards them. Novel shortcuts as dem-
onstrated in honeybee flight trajectories support
such a view, but related neural data do not exist.
The waggle dance in honeybees offers a unique
avenue into the potential neural organization of
deciding between behavioral options, for example
between a feeding place known from former expe-
rience and a feeding place indicated by a dancing
bee. Dance followers decide whether to explore the
place reported by the dancer or to return to the
place they had experienced before depending on
value parameters extracted from the dance and the
memory about their old place (Biesmeijer and
Seeley 2005). Bees fly shortcuts between these
two sites depending on several conditions, e.g.,
how many dances they had followed, whether
these sites were closer or further away and whether
the shortcut was shorter or equally long as the
return flight to the hive (Menzel et al. 2011). Neural
operations based on the retrieval of stored vector
information (experienced and dance communicat-
ed) or operations on the level of a map-like
memory structure require the simultaneous activa-
tion of the respective memories (the flight vectors
from the hive to the respective site or the represen-
tation of the sites in a map-like memory) in such a
way that decisions can be made about which site
should be chosen, which one should be aimed for
first, whether the other site should be approached,
or whether the outbound journey should be termi-
nated and the home trip started. The essence of the
question whether a bee has a cognitive map is,
therefore, not really meant to be related to the
neural procedures involved in coding spatial rela-
tions but rather whether the neural knowledge base
supports decisions between behavioral options, po-
tential behaviors. These options would have to be
evaluated on the basis of the expected respective
outcomes. So, do bees have expectations and create
intentions and where in the brain should we search
for neural correlates (Menzel 2017a)?
In 1967, I asked Karl von Frisch where he would
expect to find the memory for flowers in the bee
brain, and he respondedwith a skeptical look: “Why
in the brain? Isn’t it much too small?” With this
answer, von Frisch stayed true to himself. In 1959,
he wrote: “Insects have—even in relation to their
body size—a very unprepossessing brain, not creat-
ed to reflect or make inventions. They too accom-
plish astonishing intellectual feats, complex and
meaningful actions. But they do not consider what
they should sensibly do in any given case. How they
should behave, that is essentially something they are
born with. Innate behavior, ‘instincts,’ guide them
on their way through life. Tried and tested over
thousands of years, inherited through countless gen-
erations, instincts only fail when suddenly faced
with unfamiliar tasks. They do not need a lot of
brain matter because they restrict themselves to just
a few tasks. They are designed for the normal case,
for which, of course, the circuits of the nervous
process in a perfect way.” (von Frisch 1959). What
is a normal case for a bee?Does it help tomake only
instinct responsible for solving the task of pollina-
tion? The flower market for a pollinator that lives all
year round in any temperate climate is too complex
to be genetically encoded. Which flower will offer
which food at which quantity and quality at which
place and at which time is not predicable. The
current distribution of ever-changing locations of
nectar, pollen, resin, or water needs to be explored
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as well as potential nest sites. Thus, the rules of the
environment and the current situation need to be
learned, and they cannot be innate. There simply is
no normal case.
The brain which does this is indeed small (1 mm3
with less than 1 million neurons), but does size
count in this respect? I believe von Frisch meant
that it is not only a matter of size but also of
difference. Brains that create expectations and in-
tentions are thought not only to contain more neu-
rons but also to organize them in different andmore
complex ways. Only such brains are thought to
represent the world in a way that planning is possi-
ble by internally activating a relevant memory in-
dependent of external stimulus conditions, recruit
expectations, evaluate them, and decide between
options. We do not know whether the bee brain
lacks such networks, and we have only limited
evidence for such networks in the mammalian or
human brain (Krain et al. 2006).What we do know,
however, is that the bee brain does not seem to be
different in any fundamental way from large brains.
The working of the networks can be explored with
electrophysiological and neural imaging methods.
These methods capture the “noise of thinking” in
the brain. Christian Morgenstern (1871–1914), a
poet well known in Germany, once wrote this
aphorism: “Thoughts make noise. Who knows
whether thoughts don’t also make a very tiny
noise that could be picked up by the finest instru-
ments and empirically deciphered (by comparison
and experiment).” Here are a few examples. (1)
The sensory space is organized like a neural map.
Odors are represented in the antennal lobe in
overlapping activity patterns of activated glomer-
uli similar to odor representation in the olfactory
bulb of mammals (Joerges et al. 1997). (2) The
appetitive value system involved in olfactory
learning can be traced to identified neurons that
have properties comparable to those found in the
ventral tegmentum of the mammalian brain.
These similarities include such derived properties
as reward expectation and coding of prediction
error (Hammer and Menzel 1995; Schultz 2006).
(3) The convergence site of highly processed sen-
sory pathways, the mushroom body, is nested in a
pathway parallel to the direct sensory-motor con-
nections similar to what is known from the general
organization of the mammalian brain (honeybee
brain atlas: https://insectbraindb.org/app/species/7
). (4) Memory contents (e.g., in the olfactory
domain) are encoded in patterns of synaptic
changes in the mushroom body calyx (Szyszka
et al. 2008), similarly to what we know about
memory contents stored in the mammalian olfac-
tory bulb (Wilson and Stevenson 2003). Formal
models have picked up essential components of
such memory matrices (review: Webb 2019). (5)
Read-out neurons of the mushroom body code
sensory stimuli in multimodal-, experience-, and
attention-dependent way (Menzel 2014). Inhibito-
ry feedback neurons to the input of the mushroom
body generate a neural error signal after incorrect
behavioral responses in addition to their stimulus
valuation (Filla and Menzel 2015). Thus, like in
the mammalian brain, mushroom body output
neurons encode stimulus conditions in combina-
torial patterns of excitation and inhibition. These
patterns may precede behavioral actions under
instrumental and self-induced behavioral condi-
tions (Zwaka et al. 2018; Duer et al. 2015:
Paffhausen et al. 2020). Formal models will need
to include these properties in attempts.
3 . THE WAGGLE DANCE : AN
INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOR?
Probably the most important discovery of the last
century in behavioral biology was the elucidation of
the encoding and decoding processes of the waggle
dance. The discoverer, Karl von Frisch, struggled
with the interpretation of this unique communication
process. He frequently emphasized that he used the
term “language” as a metaphor but he also insisted:
“It would be equally wrong and a denial of the facts
if one would place the bees’ method of communi-
cation on par with the warning calls of many other
animals or the similarly simple ‘communications of
social associations.” (von Frisch 1953). Indeed, if
only a flight instruction were communicated with
fixed relations between the waggle run relative to
gravity as a measure for the outbound direction
relative to the momentary sun azimuth and the dis-
tance with the length of the waggle run (or the
number of waggles), we would not classify it as an
intelligent communication system. The question,
therefore, is what is encoded and decoded?
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Encoding and decoding direction does not require a
visible sun; landmarks are sufficient (von Frisch and
Lindauer 1954; Dyer and Gould 1981). Dances
occur at night with correct codes for the feeder
trained during the day (von Frisch 1967). Bees dance
only after they have explored the environment.
Thus, waggle dance communication is a symbolic
form of communication based onmotor patterns and
accompanied stimuli. How should one deal with the
question of what is actually communicated at which
level of cognition? Von Frisch said in a public talk:
“But what about thinking? Can one speak of a
symbol even where there is no thought behind it?
… But insects are differently organized. They show
no sign of deliberation, no hint of any emotion. And
if one wants to argue that we cannot identify what
goes on in the ganglion cells behind the chitin-
armored browof a fly, all their actions and omissions
are proven to be innate in every detail, given to them
as a pre-formed instinctual act that, from their point
of view, would not be worth thinking about. And
yet, especially in insects, we find themost wonderful
examples for the topic of this lecture. I don’t mean
the web balloon of the fly, but rather the symbolic
dances in a colony of bees, which are not only
triggers for an action but communicate complex
facts and, almost like the words and sentences of
our language, give very specific instructions for the
action that is to be undertaken. They serve not only
as keys to a lock, but rather – if I may stay with the
image – they offer the partner a rich view through
the open gateway.” (von Frisch 1959).
The waggle dance is a true communication pro-
cess including feedback from the receiver, the
dance following the bees. Von Frisch observed
begging signals from a dance follower, leading to
trophalaxis between dancer and follwer. Short sig-
nals stopping the dancer occur also in other condi-
tions, for example in swarms when a scout bee
causes another dancing scout bee to terminate its
dances for a new nest site (Seeley et al. 2012). Such
feedback signals to the dancer are particularly in-
teresting in a context in which both communicating
bees have been visiting the same feeder, and one
experienced a dangerous situation at the feeder. In
such a situation, it can happen that the latter bee
produces a stop signal to the dancing bee (Nieh
2010; Jack-McCollough and Nieh 2015). The fol-
lowing bee must have identified an experienced
location via the symbolic message and related it
to the local qualities of that object, which is a form
of mapping solely on the basis of symbolic codes.
Object identity and spatial characteristics are thus
combined in an object-unique manner.
Indeed, the waggle dance is not a language in
the strict sense because it lacks the multitude of
symbols necessary for close to unlimited combi-
natorial patterns; it has no grammar, and the learn-
ing component does not include the symbolic code
(Menzel 2019). Nevertheless, the symbolically
encoded outbound flight vectors are interpreted
by the recruit as a location in spatial relations to
explored locations (Menzel et al. 2011). Recent
experiments have shown in addition that both
messages, the flight instruction as a vector and
the location, are used by the recruited in their
search flights (Menzel et al. subm.). Although no
neural correlates of this behavior exist so far, evi-
dence is accumulating that the dance message is
embedded in a memory of the environment orga-
nized like a cognitive map reporting intentions
about a location in the environment (Menzel
2019). In this sense, the waggle dance is an intel-
ligent behavior, though not a language. The di-
mensions of intelligence involved in this unique
communication system need to be probed in the
direction of whether there is intentionality on both
the sender and the receiver sides (Menzel 2017b).
4. CONCLUSION
Intelligence in animals has many facets, but the
most important components are forms of learning
beyond elementary associations and a memory
structure that allows decisions to be made without
access to the stimuli-controlling behavior. I have
focused here on the life of the worker honeybee
outside its social community facing conditions that
require her full neural power. The last 50 years have
witnessed a shift towards the cognitive components
of this behavior. This shift was only possible on the
foundations laid by researchers during the first half
of the twentieth century, which were nineteenth
century. Their research involved the development
of new methods, the careful design of experiments,
and the quantification of the individual bee’s behav-
ior. The initial focus on questions of sensory phys-
iology was highly productive, but the restrictions
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imposed by traditional ethology had to be overcome
in order to understand the behavioral richness and
flexibility of the foraging bee. As in other disci-
plines of behavioral biology, an important compo-
nent of the cognitive shift was the path into the
brain, including the discovery of the workings of
identified neurons and networks and the neural
substrates of memory. Further understanding of
the honeybee’s intelligence will come from a com-
bined approach to behavior in more natural condi-
tions and the neural processes involved. Exciting
experimental procedures are at hand. Opto-
physiological recordings allow monitoring the spa-
tiotemporal patterns of clusters of neurons down to
the resolution of synaptic complexes (Joerges et al.
1997). The miniature size of the bee brain together
with its learning capacity under laboratory condi-
tions offers advantages unmet by other animals. The
advent of molecular-genetic techniques will revolu-
tionize neuroscience beyond the well-established
model systems like C. elegans and Drosophila .
Honeybees will be cooperative in these endeavors
as they have been over the last 25 years.
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